By Wu Hongying
Behind the front page headlines of local protests throughout his
Latin American trip, US President George W. Bush was persistent in
demonstrating his policy readjustment in the region.
From March 8 through 14, Bush visited Brazil, Uruguay, Colombia,
Guatemala and Mexico. The week-long tour of the five Latin American
nations was an indication that a major readjustment of Washington's
Latin American policies was under way.
Bush's Latin American trip should be seen as an unusual
diplomatic tour de force. Both the duration and scale of the trip
exceeded all his previous trips to Latin America, which usually saw
him landing in one or two countries and staying for only a few
hours. This time, he spent a whole week paying official visits to
five countries, unprecedented in every sense of the word.
The five countries he visited had been painstakingly selected.
They include the top two nations in the region (Brazil and Mexico
rank first and second in GDP) as well as two less powerful
countries (Uruguay and Guatemala).
Mexico and Colombia are US allies, while Brazil, Uruguay and
Guatemala are the United States' friends. Even their political
colors are different right-wing governments in Colombia, Mexico and
Guatemala, and left-leaning moderates in Paraguay and Uruguay. In
geographical terms, there is the United States' southern neighbor
(Mexico), one country in Central America (Guatemala) and three in
South America (Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay).
These carefully picked destinations reflect the Bush
administration's intention to improve its relations with Latin
American countries as a whole. The topics of Bush's talks with his
hosts were nation-specific, showing Washington's concern over
different issues with each of the five.
Bush's meeting with Brazilian President de Lula focused on
cooperation in ethanol development since Brazil is the leading
ethanol producing country in Latin America. His talks with
Uruguayan President Tabare Vazquez were mainly about free trade
because Uruguay is keen to improve trade ties with the United
States.
In Colombia, Bush's talks with President Alvaro Uribe Velez
centered on fighting terrorism and drug trafficking, because the
host country hopes the United States will continue its support for
the Colombia Plan. And his talks with Guatemalan President Oscar
Berger emphasized immigration and labor policies, the focus of
bilateral disputes.
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The top issues Bush discussed with Mexican President Calderon were
immigration, drugs and border security, areas the United States can
sink its teeth into. All this shows major administration efforts
behind the Latin American trip.
The trip was designed to mend rifts between the United States
and Latin American countries against an unusual backdrop. Bush
declared soon after taking office that the United States considered
its relations with Latin American countries, especially with
Mexico, more important than other diplomatic ties.
However, after 9/11, the United States shifted its strategic
focus to the war on terror, and Latin America lost significance in
Washington's global strategy.
Meanwhile, as the economy in Latin America improved and the wish
to be free from US influence grew, Latin America's left wing rose
fast.
Last year saw a large number of leftist parties winning general
elections or re-election in Latin America. Venezuelan President
Chavez's recent actions are particularly noteworthy.
Chavez has been publicly challenging US supremacy by rallying
support for regional integration, leaning on oil resources and ties
with the Southern Common Market (Mercosur). Chavez not only
expanded his influence in the world as well as the region but also
formed an "axis of conscience" with Cuba and Bolivia. One result
has been increasing Washington concern over the disturbance in its
backyard.
The growing Western Hemisphere presence of third parties such as
China and Russia has also added to US concern that it is losing
control.
Largely for these reasons the United States found itself
reassessing the region's place in its global strategy in a bid to
readjust its Latin American policies. The strategies are to reenter
its backyard, pull back Latin American slippage, and isolate the
leftist flag bearer Venezuelan President Chavez. The Bush
administration is hoping to reduce domestic political pressure
while securing US strategic interests and leadership in Latin
America.
A White House spokesperson announced before Bush embarked on his
Latin American trip that the president "will emphasize America's
commitment to the Western Hemisphere and push for common
itineraries conducive to the promotion of our freedom, prosperity
and social justice". Judging by the result of this trip, Bush did
not return empty-handed, though he failed to achieve all his
goals.
First, his visit rekindled Latin Americans' expectations in the
United States. In the past year or so, Bush has sent a string of
senior Washington officials down south to discuss issues of common
concern, such as immigration, counter-terrorism, free trade and
military cooperation, presenting new plans and measures.
Bush also announced an aid package worth several hundred million
dollars before setting off for Latin America. He followed up during
the trip with repeated promises of goodwill, giving Latin Americans
the impression that the United States was refocusing on the
region.
Second, he managed to strengthen US relations with some of the
Latin American countries by convincing them to oppose some of the
leftist leaders. This is in synch with Washington's efforts in
recent years to contain the spreading leftist movement.
On this trip Bush succeeded in forging a strategic ethanol
alliance with the largest moderate leftist government in Latin
America led by Brazilian President de Lula and winning over the
Uruguayan government, another moderate left-leaning administration,
with a free trade agreement.
By playing these hands he achieved some improvement in US
relations with moderate leftists while isolating some
hardliners.
At the same time, this trip also reinforced Washington's ties
with its economic ally Mexico and military ally Colombia.
Lastly, Bush made full use of the energy resources trump card.
This was highlighted by the signing of the Brazil-US Memorandum on
Ethanol Fuel Cooperation. It can be seen as a de facto strategic
ethanol alliance between the two counties based on the US advantage
in corn-to-ethanol technology.
This alliance will not only allow the US to enjoy future
leadership in the Latin American ethanol market but also tie
Brazil, with the region's leading energy resources, firmly to
America's chariot. It could also reduce future US reliance on
Venezuelan oil.
The most important signal sent out by Bush's Latin American
visit is that the US has begun to readjust its Latin American
policies. In fact, this policy readjustment started early last year
with the appointment of Thomas Shannon Jr, an old hand in Latin
American affairs, as assistant secretary of state for western
hemisphere affairs.
The readjustment of Washington's Latin American policies picked
up pace with the Shannon appointment. Related political moves
included the appointment of another Latin American affairs expert,
John Negroponte, as undersecretary of state; the establishment of a
special office to gather intelligence on Cuba and Venezuela;
gearing up contacts with power circles in Latin American countries;
and increasing the US diplomatic offensive in the region.
On the economic side, Washington has increased financial input
in Latin America, as seen in the climb to US$1.6 billion in
financial assistance for Latin America. This is a 4 percent
increase over the current year in the 2008 budget that Bush
presented to Congress.
On March 5, in his address to members of the Latin American
Chamber of Commerce in the US, Bush made particular mention of the
Millennium Challenge Project, saying the US would make it a key
task to help Latin America alleviate poverty.
In military affairs, the United States has strengthened its
cooperation with Latin American armed forces, for example by
providing training for Latin American military personnel. Also
noteworthy is Washington's designation of 2007 as the Year of Latin
American Contact.
As US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas
Burns explained at the time, 2007 is the "year for US commitments"
to Latin America, "a year for the US to do more for Latin American
countries and a year for more communication".
Clearly the United States will attach more importance and direct
more input to Latin America in a bid to reduce friction.
But, as there are still many areas, including immigration,
counter-terrorism, anti-drug operations, energy resources and the
Americas free trade zone, where the US finds itself at odds with
Latin American nations, it will be very difficult for Washington to
resolve differences in the near future. That means we will not see
any tangible improvement in the lukewarm relations between the
United States and Latin America any time soon.
The author is a researcher and director of the Latin America
Studies Division of the China Institute of Modern International
Relations.
(China Daily March 21, 2007)
