On Jan 14, Ma Ying-jeou, the incumbent leader of Taiwan, won a hard fought battle for re-election. In 2008, the charismatic Ma had helped the Kuomintang return to power in a landslide after eight years of rule by the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). This time around, Ma garnered 51.6 percent of the vote, while his chief rival, Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP, won 45.6 percent.

In 2008, it was easy for political analysts to explain Ma's overwhelming victory over Hsieh Chang-ting, the DPP candidate. For starters, the highest levels of the DPP had been tarnished by scandal and corruption. But there were numerous other events that had negatively affected Taiwan during the administration of Chen Shui-bian. These included a precipitous deterioration in ties with the Chinese mainland, unprecedented strains in unofficial relations with the US, and increased political polarization, ethnic division and gridlock at home. To put it succinctly, Taiwan's people were fed up with the antics of Chen Shui-bian and some other politicians. This explains why Ma won an astounding 58 percent of the vote, while Hsieh got only 42 percent.

Ma's re-election has been welcomed by most people in Taiwan, the mainland and the international community. But a small group of pro-separatist pundits have sought to take the shine off Ma's victory by peddling unfair and inaccurate interpretations of the electoral contest.

Some blamed the surprising margin of victory on the Taiwan businesspeople who took the time out of their busy schedules to return from the mainland (and abroad) to vote in the election. Rather than being praised for their civic spirit and commitment to public affairs, they have been vilified as "pro-business cheerleaders with no country of their own." The implication is clear: it was "unfair" for the hardworking and civic-minded businesspeople to participate in Taiwan's elections.

Others have proffered yet another excuse for the DPP's sound drubbing at the polls. They claimed that the United States influenced Taiwan's voters and pointed to several "cases of bias." For example, in September 2011, one unnamed US official told the Financial Times that Washington had "distinct doubts" about Tsai's ability to maintain stable relations with Beijing.

Moreover, in the run-up to the election, the US announced that it might soon allow Taiwan tourists visa-free travel to the US. And only days before the election, Douglas Paal, former director of the American Institute in Taiwan, arrived in Taipei and endorsed the 1992 Consensus, while blasting Tsai's so-called Taiwan consensus as meaning that she had no desire to reach any agreements with the Chinese mainland if elected.

Only two examples are provided here for lack of space. But clearly the inference of these and some other analyses is that the DPP is not responsible for its loss at the polls. Somehow, we are supposed to believe that powerful "outside forces" are at work. In fact, nothing could be further from the truth.

To her credit, Tsai made some efforts to appear moderate and reasonable. She even pledged to expand links with the mainland. But perhaps due to pressure from extremist elements within her party, Tsai refused to publicly renounce "independence" as an option for Taiwan. It is likely that the same considerations led her to oppose the 1992 Consensus, an arrangement that enables the two sides of the Taiwan Straits to talk with each other. Rather, Tsai offered an opaque "Taiwan consensus", a proposal she never fully explained causing confusion throughout the entire political spectrum in Taiwan. It appeared not to make sense to anyone, including members of her own party.

Ma's victory may be attributed to a number of considerations. For instance, he is honest. His administration has not been rocked by scandals, bribery or corruption. He will not tolerate such behavior. Furthermore, Ma has never embraced a separatist agenda or gone out of his way to provoke the mainland. Despite the differences that exist between the two sides of the Straits, Ma appears committed to the "peaceful development" of cross-Straits relations. For example, the two sides have signed a free trade pact, opened direct flights between major cities, and signed an agreement enabling millions of mainland tourists to visit Taiwan. There is even talk of a peace agreement. Also, Taiwan is no longer considered a "troublemaker" in the global community. And finally, Ma has sought to mend Taiwan's social fabric that was torn and frayed during Chen Shui-bian's tenure in office.

When one compares Ma's solid record of accomplishments to the ill-defined promises of Tsai (and her party's dismal track record during 2000-2008), it is clear that Taiwan's voters made the rational choice when they cast their ballots on Jan 14. But one should not jump to the hasty conclusion that it will be all smooth sailing for Ma during his second term. The economic turmoil created by the 2008 global financial crisis continues to undermine global economic stability. Indeed, the European debt crisis threatens Taiwan and the mainland both. Besides, the income gap in Taiwan - like on the mainland - continues to widen and could become a source of instability.

Ma has to take measures to close the growing gap between the rich and the poor. And although cross-Straits relations are at their best since 1949, there could be some temporary setbacks because it is only natural that the two sides may see things differently from time to time. In sum, as Ma warned on election night: "We have to be glad for just one day." This is because Ma will confront a lot of daunting challenges in the next four years.

The author is director of the Graduate Program in Global Studies in the Department of Political Science at Missouri State University. He served as an election observer in Taipei between Jan 9 and Jan 15.