The Cold War period in global security, where all that mattered was keeping the balance between American and Soviet interests, is now long past. For two decades in a post-Cold War era, the Soviet Union is no more, and its successor state, Russia, has become just one of many elements counterbalancing what is frequently seen as a Western tendency to hyperactivity in world affairs.

During this phase China has generally lined up with Russia in advising caution on such issues as the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya and now Syria. This has occasionally irritated the West, but we do understand that serious questions must be asked about the benefits of intervention in the world's trouble spots before rushing in; no-one in Europe or the US can doubt that the consequences of intervention have not always been straightforward.

However, during this post-Cold War phase the Chinese approach to foreign affairs has undergone development. In the immediate aftermath of 1989 – when China had its own troubles – the Chinese attitude consisted of a simple appeal to non-interference in other countries' internal affairs. This at least is a simple principle to operate; but it assumes that the internal problems of one country can have no effect on the wider security situation in the world, or that, if they do have such an effect, it is no-one's responsibility to contain it. This attitude is only possible if a country withdraws from responsibility for the wider security situation, as China did during the Cold War period and as Russia has done since.

Russian and Chinese approaches have begun to diverge during this era of post-Cold War mentalities. China, as befits its growing power and economic significance, is realizing that instability in any part of the world has potential implications for regional and global security, and that China's global economic reach requires attention to the maintenance of stability. Simply referring back to the "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence" is not enough; peaceful co-existence between states is a necessary condition for economic progress, but not a sufficient one. As an economically proactive power, China is recognising this; Russia, as an increasingly reactive one, which relies largely on the fact that other countries have to come to her for energy supplies, is far less concerned about stability.

Russia's generally passive approach to international economic affairs is demonstrated by the slow progress of the Sino-Russian gas pipeline project. This has been under discussion for well over a decade. Potentially, it could secure a large part of China's gas supplies and a considerable segment of Russia's energy exports for some time to come. But the Russians seem curiously uninterested in pushing this forward – not helped, admittedly, by the strong interest expressed by Mongolia in having the pipeline diverted through her own territory. It would seem that Russia is none too keen on engaging with China along their mutual border; she evidently sees a medium to long term threat in the imbalance between the flourishing Chinese north and the languishing Russian Far East.

Russia appears also to have adopted a most peculiar approach to her immediate security environment. Rather than ensuring, as most countries would normally do, that peace and cooperation take first place in its relations with its immediate periphery, it seems to be surrounding itself with simmering disputes and unstable buffer regions. Relations with its western neighbours (even, at times, with the normally compliant Belarus) are marked by persistent sabre rattling and the use of Russian or quasi-Russian minorities to cause difficulties for neighbouring governments. Even some of Russia's own constituent republics (Chechnya, Dagestan, Abkhazia, Ossetia) are allowed to make a notable contribution to regional unrest. Europe and the US have occasionally criticized China's policy towards its peripheral western regions; but it cannot be denied that China is motivated largely by the desire to preserve good order along her borders. Russia seems strangely indifferent to this requirement.

This is a classic contrast between the world-view of an expanding power and that of a diminishing one. Superficially, China and Russia have similar styles of governance and similar interests in counterbalancing an over-mighty West. However, China sees stability as the essential foundation to safeguard and build on its position in the global framework. Russia seems to need an unstable world around it to emphasize the need for unity behind President Putin's regime. Any relaxation of tension might weaken the regime's grip, and that is regarded as more important than a stable security environment for the nation to develop in. It is as well that China appears to have passed this point, and can grow its economy and international standing at the same time as contributing to global security.

The author is a columnist with China.org.cn. For more information please visit: http://www.by33321.com/opinion/timcollard.htm

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